of contemporary wars takes place within rather than between states, many of them have transnational dimensions. 4 Nearly half of all rebel groups listed in a global dataset on armed conºict since 1945 either allegedly or explicitly received material support from a foreign state. 5 The importance of these alliances is most striking in post-Cold War sub-Saharan Africa: with one partial exception, every episode of internal armed conºict from 1990 to 2010 that reached the standard threshold of war-at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year-featured external support to the rebel side from at least one African state. 6 Stephen Walt, a leading alliance theorist, confessed in 2009 that he knew "next-to-nothing" about the Congo Wars, despite being "a full-time professional in the ªeld of international relations and security studies" and despite teaching a course on the origins of modern wars at Harvard University. 7 Although Walt and other scholars have applied their theories to interstate alliances in what used to be called the Third World, the deeply ingrained statecentrism of the alliance literature has led almost all of them to ignore relations between states and foreign rebel groups. 8 Building on the work of these scholars, this article advances the argument that most African rulers form alliances with rebel groups in nearby states to mitigate the internal threats of coups d'état and rebellions. 9 My focus on political survival as the fundamental cause of transnational alliance formation distinguishes the article from existing literature on external support for rebel groups, which provides relatively long lists of state motives, simply refers to an abstract policy dispute and then models the interstate bargaining implications of pro-rebel support, or conceives of such support as conºict delegation and then focuses on the characteristics of rebel agents. 10 Jeffrey Checkel's 2013 critique of the literature on the transnational dimensions of civil war highlights that "speciªc causal mechanisms remain poorly understood," because much of the predominantly quantitative work fails to provide satisfactory evidence for the mechanisms posited to explain correlational ªndings. 11 This article takes up Checkel's suggestions for improving existing scholarship. 12 Theoretically, it connects insights from quantitative research to a well-established body of literature in international relationsalliance theory-and to the broader leader-centric approach in political science. 13 Analytically and methodologically, it focuses on the causal mechanisms that link a ruler's struggle for political survival to the formation of transnational alliances, and assesses the observable implications of these mechanisms by process tracing alliance decisions in the two Congo Wars.
More speciªcally, I develop a strategic theory that highlights three mechanisms-transnational threat, resource opportunity, and transnational afªnity. The ªrst is linked to the internal threat of rebellion: if a ruler believes that a neighboring ruler's support to his domestic foes is imminent (or has already occurred), he is likely to respond by forming a preemptive (or retaliatory) alliance with that neighbor's armed opposition. 14 The other two mechanisms are linked to the internal threat of a coup: if key members of a ruler's domestic support coalition have a strong interest in either the material beneªts related to lootable natural resources in a nearby country or the nonmaterial beneªts derived from supporting cross-border ethnic or ideological kin, a ruler is likely to ensure their continued allegiance by sponsoring rebel groups in the relevant country. The theory section uses anecdotal evidence from across Africa to illustrate the broader applicability of these arguments.
The empirical section then systematically evaluates the theory in the context of the two Congo Wars. Drawing on a wide range of sources (including interviews conducted in the region), it investigates the alliance decisions made by the rulers of Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Two of them (Rwanda and Uganda) formed alliances with Congolese rebels in both wars; two others (Angola and Zimbabwe) switched from supporting rebels in the ªrst war to siding with the Congolese ruler in the second war; and one (Sudan) consistently sided with Congolese rulers. The section leverages this variation in outcomes to show that the logic of the theory can easily be extended to explain why some rulers formed interstate alliances instead of transnational ones. Overall, I ªnd that nine of the ten alliance decisions are best explained by concerns for political survival, with the tenth case providing support for both my theory and alternative explanations.
The remainder of this article proceeds in ªve sections. First, I deªne transnational alliances and discuss alternative terms such as "proxy alliances." Second, I lay out the core assumptions, scope conditions, and causal mechanisms of my strategic theory. Third, I sketch alternative explanations for why rulers form transnational alliances that go beyond political survival, including a ruler's desire for regional inºuence. Fourth, I discuss the research design and analyze the ªve foreign rulers' alliance decisions in the Congo Wars. I conclude with implications for policy and future research.
Deªning Transnational Alliances
The theoretical study of military alliances in international relations has a long legacy of ignoring nonstate actors. 15 Alliances are typically deªned as formal "agreements, treaties, or conventions among states pledging to coordinate their behavior and policies in the contingency of military conºict." 16 Even according to one of the broadest existing deªnitions, "an alliance is a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states." 17 This state-centrism has helped lend coherence to the research program on alliances, but it has also made it less relevant for the study of contemporary military conºicts, which almost always pit a state's security forces against a rebel group. 18 Although some insights from the alliance literature have recently been applied to intrastate cooperation between warring groups in multiparty civil wars, 19 there is very little research on cooperative relations between states and foreign rebel groups that explicitly builds on alliance theory. 20 This article therefore helps build an important bridge between the well-established alliance literature and the burgeoning literature on the transnational dimensions of civil war. In this context, the deªnition of alliances needs to be broadened to include formal or informal arrangements for security cooperation not only between sovereign states but also between states and nonstate armed groups from different states. The former can then be referred to as "interstate alliances," the latter as "transnational alliances." 21 Some scholars consider external sponsorship of rebel groups as a substitute for the direct use of force against a common enemy, thus conceptualizing such support as either conºict delegation or proxy warfare. 22 These scholars disagree, however, about whether sponsor-proxy relationships can be called alliances. 23 Although opponents rightly note that state-rebel cooperation is typically less formal and more secretive than interstate alliances, their argument that the expediency or opportunism involved in the former is qualitatively different is unconvincing. 24 Alliance theorists such as Hans Morgenthau have long argued that interstate alliances are "not a matter of principle but of expediency," too. 25 Scholars also disagree about whether the term "proxy" should apply to conºicts in which states directly intervene alongside foreign rebels. 26 To avoid conceptual confusion, I thus prefer the broader term "transnational alliance," which encompasses direct and indirect state involvement, to the more speciªc "proxy alliance." Table 1 highlights the ubiquity of transnational alliances in sub-Saharan Africa from 1990 to 2010. Twenty-one out of twenty-two episodes of intrastate war featured at least one transnational alliance. In four of them (including the Congo Wars), African states also sent in troops to support the rebel side. Overall, the table shows that intraregional security competition has been intense. Extraregional powers, by contrast, have generally considered Africa as strategically less important since the end of the Cold War. 27 By focusing on post-1989 Africa, this article therefore isolates intraregional as far as possible from extraregional security dynamics.
A Strategic Theory of Transnational Alliance Formation
Transnational alliances are formed when the ruler of one state and the leader of a rebel group from another state decide to cooperate in the security realm. In material terms, such cooperation is typically asymmetric: a ruler provides more military resources to rebels than vice versa. The decision on the part of the ruler is therefore of primary importance-and it is the focus of the strategic theory developed in this section. 28 I ªrst discuss the core assumptions and scope conditions of the theory; I then turn to delineating its three causal mechanisms: threat, opportunity, and afªnity.
International
core assumptions and scope conditions Building on Steven David's argument that explanations for alliance formation in the developing world should focus on "the leader of the state rather than the state itself," 29 the theory addresses the strategic interactions of two nearby rulers with each other, their domestic support coalitions, and their domestic opposition groups. It also builds on the assumption that the basic preferences of rulers are, ªrst, to hold on to ofªce and, second, to maximize revenue while in ofªce. 30 The assumption of revenue maximization is agnostic about a ruler's speciªc goals: be they "predatory" or "developmental" (i.e., oriented toward personal wealth or public goods), revenue is required to achieve them. 31 I argue, however, that the ªrst assumption alone-political survival-can account for most of the transnational alliances formed in sub-Saharan Africa after the Cold War.
The theory also assumes that rulers typically face uncertainty: they have incomplete information about the preferences of other actors. Given this assumption, a ruler's beliefs must be speciªed, as they become "critical to the choice of strategy and the outcome of the interaction." 32 Each of the theory's mechanisms is driven by the belief of rulers that either their nearby counterpart or their domestic support coalition may turn on them.
The scope of the theory is limited. It focuses on rulers who worry about an irregular removal from ofªce through coups and rebellions, and it thus has much less to say about rulers whose main domestic concern is to be removed International in a regular manner (e.g., by losing an election). 33 In other words, the theory is not directly applicable to rulers of consolidated democracies, whose political survival depends on a large electorate rather than a relatively narrow support coalition. 34 The theory does, however, apply to the great majority of African rulersnamely, those who continue to face the threat of irregular removal from ofªce. From 1990 to 2014, thirty out of forty-three mainland sub-Saharan African states (70 percent) experienced at least one coup attempt or one year of internal armed conºict. 35 There were twenty-two successful coups in thirteen different states. 36 In addition, nine rulers from eight different states were overthrown by rebels; in eight of these cases, the rebels were in transnational alliances with nearby rulers. 37 Albeit not as immediate as military coups, rebellions thus also posed a serious threat-especially if they received external backing.
transnational threat Rulers who engage in coup-prooªng are likely to form transnational alliances against nearby rulers in response to a transnational threat, which I deªne alternatively as a ruler's belief (1) that a nearby ruler is about to provide arms to domestic opposition groups, or (2) that such interference has recently occurred. 38 Alliance formation is preemptive in the ªrst case, retaliatory in the second. 39 Before discussing preemption in more detail, it is important to explain why rulers would rely on foreign rebels instead of-or in addition to-using their own militaries to counter transnational threats. The main answer lies in the primacy of coup-prooªng, which systematically undermines military effectiveness. 40 Military coups have historically led far more often to a ruler's removal from ofªce than rebellions (with or without foreign support). 41 In the hope of preventing coups from within their support coalitions, rulers engage in tactics such as stacking the military with loyal coethnics rather than making promotions based on merit; shufºing or purging high-ranking ofªcers; dividing the military into rival branches; and creating special paramilitary forces. 42 Rulers would counteract such tactics if they were to address transnational threats by strengthening their own military. Therefore, it is safer for them to provide arms to foreign rebels. 43 Rulers who themselves came to power through rebellion are more likely to have relatively effective militaries, which are thus more likely to be capable of responding to transnational threats with direct intervention across borders. Even for these rulers, however, joining forces with foreign rebels is attractivefor two reasons. First, rebel groups can act as force multipliers because they have "specialized knowledge about local populations, terrain, and targets." 44 Second, given that aggression by states has come to be seen as unacceptable, the cover of civil war makes it easier for nearby rulers to avoid international sanctions. 45 Similar to preemptive war, the preemptive formation of an alliance with another ruler's internal enemies is meant "to seize the initiative, in the belief that the ªrst mover gains an important advantage and [that] a ªrst move by the opponent is imminent." 46 Most transnational alliances are formed against neighboring rulers. In these cases, the main ªrst-move advantage lies in strengthening neighboring rebels who operate near border areas, thus creating a buffer zone that makes it more difªcult for the other ruler to send arms across the border.
Further below, I indirectly suggest that the mistrust that drives preemptive transnational alliance formation is often warranted; that is, rulers correctly assume that another ruler has aggressive intentions, which result from resource opportunities or transnational afªnities. In other cases, however, preemption and retaliation are the tragic result of what I call an "interference dilemma." The interstate security dilemma literature assumes that mistrust between survival-seeking rulers leads each to accumulate power in the form of military assets, resulting in arms races with the potential to escalate to war. 47 By contrast, if coup-prooªng is the primary concern of two nearby rulers, growing mutual mistrust will instead result in tit-for-tat support to the other's opposition groups.
The interference dilemma can be illustrated by the interactions between Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni.
Allegations of mutual interference existed from the very beginning of Bashir's
The Origins of Transnational Alliances 157 tenure in 1989, but it is not fully clear who made the ªrst move. According to French historian Gérard Prunier, Bashir mistakenly believed that Museveni was a personal friend and supporter of John Garang-the leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which operated near the Ugandan borderand thus decided to support anti-Museveni rebels. 48 What is clear is that titfor-tat support escalated around 1994, when Bashir's regime, which was dominated by the National Islamic Front (NIF), began to work closely with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Although this alliance has been described as "a strange coalition indeed, between a movement preaching the Ten Commandments and one proclaiming a state based on Islamist principles," 49 it made perfect sense from a strategic perspective: the LRA's stronghold in northern Uganda bordered areas of southern Sudan over which Bashir and Garang were ªghting.
resource opportunity
In personalist regimes, which have long dominated sub-Saharan Africa, rulers provide opportunities for enrichment to their domestic support coalition in exchange for its continued allegiance. 50 Such opportunities may be found not only at home but also in nearby states-for example, when rulers form alliances with rebel groups that operate in areas containing lootable (i.e., precious, easily transportable) natural resources, especially alluvial gems and minerals. 51 The idea that natural resources lead external actors to get involved in internal armed conºicts has been called the "greedy outsiders mechanism." 52 But even though military ofªcers and other key backers may have economic mo-International tives, the reason that a ruler allows or even encourages them to exploit resources in collaboration with foreign rebels often has much less to do with greed than with political survival: "To control the military and prevent coups, Africa's leaders have often found it necessary to buy off the ofªcer corps by bringing it into the patrimonial network." 53 In the context of transnational alliance formation, a resource opportunity exists if the expected private beneªts of exploiting natural resources in a foreign rebel group's area of operations outweigh the expected private costs of supporting that group. 54 The term "private" here refers to the ruler and his support coalition. This is particularly important in the case of costs: whereas the beneªts from resource-driven alliances typically go to a select few and thus are private goods, the military expenditure involved in supporting allies constitutes public costs. 55 One of the potential private costs for the ruler is that targeted rulers are likely to retaliate, thus increasing the likelihood or severity of rebellion at home. The bigger the threat of a coup in the absence of alliance formation, the more likely the ruler is to accept this trade-off, as the threat of rebellion is typically more distant than that of a coup. 56 Resource opportunities played an important role in transnational alliances linked to conºicts in Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. 57 Liberian President Charles Taylor's involvement with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone is a prominent example in which it is nearly impossible to distinguish personal greed from the political need "to manage unruly associates." 58 At the time, a United Nations report noted that Taylor "and a small coterie of ofªcials and private businessmen around him are in control of a covert sanctions-busting apparatus that includes international criminal activity and the arming of the RUF in Sierra Leone." 59 This apparatus was "fed by the smuggling of diamonds and the extraction of natural resources in both Liberia and areas under rebel control in Sierra Leone." 60 By providing such opportunities for enrichment, Taylor ensured the allegiance of his support coalition.
transnational afªnity
The resource opportunity mechanism is based on the idea that a ruler can effectively buy off support coalition members who would otherwise consider staging a coup. But what if key backers care more about nonmaterial issues, such as ideology or ethnic kinship, than about wealth? In his study of foreign involvement in ethnic conºicts, Stephen Saideman argues that rulers who face intense domestic pressure "will certainly give assistance to those with whom their supporters share ethnic ties." 61 Building on this argument, I suggest more broadly that, to mitigate the threat of a coup, a ruler is likely to form an alliance with a nearby rebel group if there is a strong transnational afªnitythat is, shared ideological commitments or ethnic ties-between that group and key members of the ruler's support coalition.
Sudan's transnational alliances with Islamist rebel groups in Eritrea and Ethiopia, which began around 1993 and led to retaliation from both states, provide good examples of ideological afªnities. 62 President Bashir and other "military ofªcers who held formal executive ofªces of state were pragmatists who did not want to expose Sudan to the dangers of an adventurist foreign policy,"
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whereas "the leadership of the NIF under Hassan al Turabi was in favour of an ideologically driven, regionally aggressive policy." 63 The NIF's position prevailed largely because Bashir could not afford to antagonize Turabi's Islamists, who-according to a U.S. State Department report-"effectively controlled the Government." 64 The importance of ethnic afªnities is illustrated by Chad's transnational alliance with Sudanese rebels in neighboring Darfur. In May 2004, President Idriss Déby faced a coup attempt that was reportedly caused by the plotters' frustration with Déby's unwillingness to support their Zaghawa coethnics across the border. "[T]o retain his presidential seat he capitulated to almost all the mutineers' demands," appointing individuals with close ties to the Darfurian rebels to senior government positions and providing the rebels with material support. 65 
Alternative Explanations for Transnational Alliances
The strategic theory advanced in the previous section suggests that rulers form transnational alliances to safeguard against internal threats to their political survival from their support coalition and from opposition groups. Existing work on state sponsorship of rebel groups and on intervention more broadly provides little in the way of well-developed theoretical explanations that could be considered alternatives to this theory. Patrick Regan concedes that, despite more than a decade of research on interventions into civil wars, "we know next to nothing about the goals of the interveners." 66 By assuming only that an intervention reºects the desire for conºict management or geopolitical manipulation, "researchers have tended to avoid the attribution of more speciªc goals to the intervention." 67 Similarly, one of the most prominent studies of The Origins of Transnational Alliances 161 state sponsorship simply notes that the "speciªc goals that states hope to achieve by supporting rebels may vary." 68 Albeit theoretically underdeveloped, the lists of state sponsors' motives that some scholars have compiled do provide several potential alternatives to my theory's relatively narrow concern with political survival (and with the revenue required to ensure it). 69 The clearest alternatives are those that focus on regional inºuence and prestige, 70 at least if one assumes that these objectives have intrinsic beneªts for rulers. 71 Put differently, status-seeking represents a foreign policy goal that goes beyond-and may stand in tension withsurvival-seeking. 72 To avoid conªrmation bias, 73 the case studies on the Congo Wars also consider whether transnational alliances were motivated by ethnicity or political ideology without clearly being linked to political survival. 74 Given space constraints, however, I discuss alternative explanations only if they feature prominently in the existing literature on these wars.
Transnational Alliance Formation in the Congo Wars
This section assesses the explanatory power of my strategic theory of transnational alliance formation in the context of the Congo Wars. Taking into account alternative explanations, I evaluate whether the theory can explain why the rulers of Angola, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe chose to support one side or the other in the two wars. The focus is therefore on these rulers' in-International ternal threats and on their strategic interactions with their Congolese counterparts, rather than on state weakness or other permissive conditions for conºict in Congo per se, which have already received sufªcient attention elsewhere. 75 I ªrst discuss the research design; then I investigate each of the foreign rulers' alliance decisions.
research design
Studying the alliance decisions of ªve foreign rulers in the two Congo Wars enables me to leverage both "cross-ruler" and "within-ruler" variation in outcomes-as shown in table 2, which also summarizes the ªndings. In both wars, Rwanda's Paul Kagame and Uganda's Yoweri Museveni formed transnational alliances with Congolese rebels while Sudan's Omar al-Bashir sided with Congolese rulers. By contrast, Angola's José Eduardo dos Santos and Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe sided with the rebels in the ªrst war and then continued to support Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the rebel-turned-ruler, in the second war.
In addition to the methodological beneªt of diversity in outcomes, the ªve rulers also represent the most important regional players in the Congo Wars. and dos Santos saved Kabila from imminent defeat in the second war. In contrast to these four rulers, Bashir did not send troops to Congo, but his air force bombed rebel positions in the second war, and his support to Ugandan rebels based in Congo was critical to Museveni's involvement in both wars. 76 By addressing why some foreign rulers supported the rebels and others their Congolese counterparts, the research design of this article improves on two existing theoretical studies on the regional causes of the Congo Wars. Boaz Atzili focuses on the effects of ªxed borders and tests two hypotheses: ªrst, that "[r]efugee movements, insurgencies, and kin connections across international borders can cause civil conºicts [. . .] to spill over their borders and become international conºicts," and second, that "[s]tate weakness promotes the possibility of international conºict by creating opportunities for neighbors to intervene to exploit the weak states economically or politically." 77 Atzili's theory and the strategic theory presented above thus share a concern with threats and opportunities as causes of intervention into civil war, but they differ in that Atzili's "conºict spillover" argument cannot explain why some neighbors intervene on the ruler's side and others on the side of the rebels. 78 In fact, Atzili explicitly conceives of conºicts-rather than interventions-as his units of analysis. 79 Similarly, John Clark's constructivist account of the Congo Wars focuses on how the regional norm of nonintervention was weakened prior to the wars, which explains only why foreign rulers intervened on the rebel side, not why some of them intervened in support of Congo's rulers. 80 In contrast to Atzili's and Clark's explanations, my strategic theory explains why nearby rulers did or did not side with the rebels, and its logic is easily extended to explain why some nearby rulers instead allied with Congo's rulers. The threat mechanism explains Bashir's and dos Santos's support: it was not the Congolese ruler but International Security 41:1 164 76. The less important cases of external involvement not analyzed here include Eritrean, Ethiopian, Tanzanian, and Zambian support for rebels in the ªrst war; Burundian support for rebels in both wars; and Chadian, Libyan, and Namibian support for Kabila in the second war. Some of these minor cases had more to do with solidarity among allied rulers than with immediate concerns about political survival. See Prunier, Africa's World War, pp. 67-68, 192-193, 198, 204, 289-290; and Reyntjens, The Great African War, pp. 61, 65-66, 198. 77. Atzili, "When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors," pp. 145-146. 78 . Atzili suggests that rulers of weak states "lack the capacity" to resettle refugees or disarm foreign rebels in their sanctuary. See ibid., p. 152. He fails to consider whether they actively support such rebels or are believed to do so. If capacity were the main issue, neighbors would be at least as likely to ally with the ruler as with his enemies. the rulers siding with his enemies who threatened Bashir in the ªrst and both Bashir and dos Santos in the second war. The opportunity mechanism explains Mugabe's support: it was not the rebels' area of operations but the territory under Kabila's control that provided Mugabe with resource opportunities in the second war. To ºesh out these assertions, I now turn to process tracing the ten alliance decisions in roughly chronological order. kagame, the afdl, and the origins of the ªrst congo war Paul Kagame's critical role in bringing together the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) in 1996 is directly attributable to the transnational threat his regime faced from Rwandan rebels who were based across the border in eastern Zaire and received support from Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko. 81 The antagonism between the two rulers dated back to Mobutu's involvement in the war that brought Kagame to power. 82 In 1990 Kagame's Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda from Uganda. The group was largely composed of Tutsi refugees who had fought on the side of Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) in the Ugandan civil war from 1981 to 1986. While Museveni-now as Ugandan president-backed the RPF, Mobutu sent troops to support the Hutu-dominated regime of his close ally Juvénal Habyarimana. 83 A fragile peace brokered in 1993 ended when Habyarimana's plane was shot down in April 1994. In the subsequent genocide against the Tutsi, an estimated 800,000 people were murdered. 84 When the RPF seized control of the capital, Kigali, in July 1994, roughly 1.5 million Hutu ºed to Zaire. Around 850,000 people settled in ªve enormous refugee camps in North Kivu and 650,000 in thirty smaller camps in South Kivu. Among them were tens of thousands of combatants who had served in the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) or in the Interahamwe militia, the main perpetrators of the genocide. 85 These ex-FAR/Interahamwe "quickly reestablished administrative control" over the Hutu refugees; for the next two years, they "ruled over signiªcant parts of eastern Zaire and pursued an active insurgency inside Rwanda." 86 Mobutu's support was "an essential factor" for the ex-FAR/Interahamwe's revival. 87 Zairian ofªcials helped the rebels in numerous ways, from facilitating weapons procurement to setting up training camps along the border with Rwanda. 88 This assistance enabled the rebels not only to reorganize their forces but also to train new recruits from among the refugee population. In early 1995, they together numbered around 50,000. 89 By comparison, Kagame's Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) had roughly 45,000 troops at the time. 90 In March 1996, Kagame spoke to U.S. Ambassador Robert Gribbin about his concerns regarding Mobutu's involvement. He told Gribbin "that if Zaire continued to support the ex-FAR/Interahamwe against Rwanda, Rwanda in turn could ªnd anti-Mobutu elements to support," adding "that if the international community could not help improve security in the region, the RPA might be compelled to act alone." 91 At the time, Kagame had already begun to assemble the AFDL, bringing together Zairian Tutsi, including the Banyamulenge of South Kivu, and long-term opponents of Mobutu, such as Laurent-Désiré Kabila. 92 In October 1996, when Kagame's army and the AFDL attacked the refugee camps in Zaire and seized control of major towns on the border, 93 Kabila found himself "in charge of making a foreign invasion look like a national rebellion." 94 The conclusion that the transnational threat constituted through the cooperation between Mobutu and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe was the principal cause of Kagame's involvement in the First Congo War is widely shared in the literature, and it was conªrmed in my interviews with senior Rwandan ofªcials and a former AFDL representative. 95 Transnational ethnic afªnities help explain the prominent role of Zairian Tutsi in the AFDL, but they were of sec-International bashir's continued alliance with mobutu During the First Congo War, Sudan's President Bashir was the only neighboring ruler actively involved on Mobutu's side. Bashir's decision to oppose the AFDL is easily explained in the context of his ongoing proxy war with Ugandan President Museveni (via the LRA), used above as an illustration of the interference dilemma. As the proxy war escalated in 1994, Bashir managed to obtain Mobutu's permission to transport supplies for the LRA through northeastern Zaire, thus bypassing areas in southern Sudan controlled by the Ugandan-backed SPLA, Bashir's main domestic foe. 97 One year later, Mobutu reportedly also allowed a Sudanese military expedition to directly attack the SPLA from Zairian territory. 98 In addition, Sudan's security services helped reorganize former Idi Amin loyalists into the West Nile Bank Liberation Front (WNBLF), which was formed in November 1994 in a Zairian town near the Ugandan border and subsequently launched incursions into northwestern Uganda. 99 In collaboration with Mobutu, Bashir also provided military support to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), formed in eastern Zaire in September 1995 as a merger of several smaller anti-Museveni groups. 100 Given that the AFDL and Kagame were allied with Museveni (see below), Bashir considered them his enemies, making their enemies-Mobutu and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe-his friends. 101 Accordingly, the Sudanese regime provided some supplies to the Rwandan rebels and later incorporated many of those who ºed to Sudan into its armed forces. 102 In the ªnal analysis, however, the war between the AFDL and Mobutu was a sideshow for Bashir, important only to the extent that it could help him counter the transnational threat from the SPLA and Museveni. This explains why Bashir did not commit more signiªcant resources in support of Mobutu once it became clear that the Zairian ruler's days were numbered. museveni and the afdl Uganda's President Museveni played a key role in the creation of the AFDL, introducing Kabila to Kagame. 103 Uganda was much less heavily involved in the First Congo War than Rwanda, however. While Kagame's army fought alongside the AFDL, Ugandan support was initially limited to providing some artillery as well as military trainers and advisers. 104 The Ugandan army entered eastern Zaire in larger numbers only in late November 1996, in retaliation for a cross-border attack by the ADF. 105 Museveni's alliance with the AFDL was primarily motivated by transnational threats emanating from Zaire, while resource opportunities and the desire for regional inºuence were secondary factors. In terms of threats, Mobutu and Museveni had been involved in tit-for-tat support to smaller rebel groups since the late 1980s. 106 From 1994 to 1996, two larger anti-Museveni groups emerged in Zaire: the WNBLF and the ADF, which-as discussed above-were sponsored by both Mobutu and Sudanese President Bashir. Museveni thus correctly believed that Bashir, "in collaboration with Mobutu," was using eastern Zaire to "create a second front" against his regime-the ªrst was in northwestern Uganda (via the LRA and the WNBLF), the second in the country's southwest (via the ADF). 107 This threat was the main reason for Museveni's intervention on the side of Kabila's AFDL. 108 In terms of opportunities, eastern Zaire's resource wealth was well known,
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as was the fact that its army had largely disintegrated by the mid-1990s. In the case of the First Congo War, however, there is no conclusive evidence for the idea that Museveni's involvement was driven by the need to provide key military ofªcers with opportunities for enrichment. On the other hand, the possibility that this concern played a secondary role should not be discarded.
Museveni "always sought to use the army to build his personal (less so the NRM's [i.e., his party's]) political base," 109 and his military had already developed a reputation for high-level corruption. 110 According to Ugandan political analysts, Museveni also envisioned a regional economic bloc that would unleash Zaire's potential, and he liked to think of himself as the region's power broker. 111 Although it is difªcult to evaluate exactly how much this desire for inºuence mattered in Museveni's decision, there is no evidence to suggest that it equaled the importance of the much more pressing security concerns. 112 dos santos and the afdl Angolan President dos Santos initially remained neutral when the AFDL emerged in eastern Zaire in late 1996. In early December, he met Zaire's prime minister and apparently agreed that Luanda would prevent the Katangan Tigers-an anti-Mobutu group that had been in Angola since 1964 and had been partly integrated into the army 113 -from crossing into Zaire. In return, Kinshasa would prevent the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) from using rear bases, thus ending the rebels' ability to export diamonds and receive arms via Zairian territory. 114 Dos Santos's ruling party had been in indirect confrontation with Mobutu ever since the Angolan war of independence. 115 When the subsequent civil conºict lost its Cold War
The Origins of Transnational Alliances 169 dimension in the early 1990s, Angola began to ºuctuate between war and peace, and Zaire became UNITA's most important sponsor. 116 Despite the noninterference agreement between dos Santos and Zaire's prime minister, several of Mobutu's close associates kept selling arms to UNITA. 117 In retaliation, dos Santos sent representatives to Rwanda for operational planning at the end of December 1996. His new objective was clear: Kinshasa had to be taken so that UNITA would lose its ability to operate via southwestern Zaire. 118 In mid-February 1997, Angola ºew 2,000 to 3,000 Katangan Tigers to Kigali, from where they entered Zaire in support of the AFDL. In late April, the Angolan army even got directly involved, entering southwestern Zaire and confronting UNITA troops-who had fought on Mobutu's behalf on several occasions-in the last major battle of the First Congo War. 119 There is a clear scholarly consensus that the transnational threat constituted by the links between Mobutu's regime and UNITA was the cause of Angola's retaliatory support for the AFDL. 120 For 1996, the strength of regime and rebel forces was estimated at 97,000 and 62,000, respectively, highlighting the enormous military threat posed by UNITA. 121 mugabe and the afdl President Mugabe's Zimbabwe was the only noncontiguous state that played a signiªcant military role in both Congo Wars. Although details on the timing and type of support in the ªrst war remain contested, it is widely believed that Mugabe provided military assistance to the AFDL well before it seized Kinshasa on May 17, 1997. 122 There was no transnational threat that could explain this support: Mugabe did not face an internal rebellion, and Mobutu did not harbor Zimbabwean opposition groups. By contrast, resource opportunities were an important factor. Coupled with regional inºuence-seeking, trans-International Security 41:1 170 national ideological afªnities also mattered, but they were not directly related to Mugabe's political survival.
Since coming to power in 1980, Mugabe has relied on "a subtle blend of intimidation and patronage" to ensure the loyalty of his domestic support coalition. 123 At the time of the First Congo War, he faced not only growing macroeconomic difªculties but also increasing demands from veterans of the liberation war as well as "economic grievances" among the army and police, which together constituted "a potential security threat." 124 There was thus an increased need to provide opportunities for enrichment. The lucrative contracts that the state-owned Zimbabwe Defence Industries won shortly after Kabila's takeover suggest that Mugabe's support to the AFDL came in exchange for the promise of future opportunities. 125 According to a news agency report from July 1997, the "motives for Zimbabwe's involvement are likely to be more economic than political." 126 On the other hand, scholars and newspaper reports also highlight the role of ideology and inºuence. Mugabe was said to despise Mobutu, considering him "a puppet of Western imperialism." 127 By contrast, Kabila's AFDL projected the image of a national liberation movement, which was well received by Mugabe's ruling party. 128 Such ideological afªnities likely interacted with Mugabe's personal ego and his desire for regional inºuence. 129 Whether these factors were more or less important than resource opportunities is difªcult to ascertain. Mugabe's involvement in the ªrst war is thus the only case out of ten that may not be best explained by my strategic theory. kagame, the rcd, and the origins of the second congo war In August 1998, less than ªfteen months after the AFDL and Rwandan forces together seized Kinshasa, a second war broke out in eastern Congo, this time pitting Congo's new president Kabila against the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), a rebel group once again created under Kagame's supervi-
The Origins of Transnational Alliances 171 sion and heavily supported by his army. Why did the former allies Kabila and Kagame turn into enemies in this relatively short span of time? The answer lies in the interference dilemma that Kabila faced vis-à-vis Kagame, which was inextricably linked to the tumultuous relations between him and the Congolese Tutsi in his support coalition. 130 It culminated in Kabila's preemptive transnational alliance with the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, which led Kagame to retaliate by sponsoring the RCD.
After the AFDL took power in Kinshasa, its Rwandan sponsors tried to control Kabila's regime by placing either themselves or Congolese Tutsi-whom they considered their most trustworthy allies-in key positions. 131 For instance, Kabila's main bodyguard and his presidential guard commander were Rwandan nationals, while his personal secretary and the foreign minister were Congolese Tutsi. 132 Perhaps most stunningly, James Kabarebe, Rwanda's key commander in the ªrst war, became chief of staff of the Congolese army. 133 Kabila, however, soon began to use his executive authority to replace, arrest, or otherwise marginalize several Congolese Tutsi. This led some of them to consider a coup against Kabila as early as November 1997, but their Rwandan interlocutors initially opposed that idea. 134 Meanwhile, in eastern Congo, local militias turned against the new government and began to cooperate with ex-FAR/Interahamwe forces who, having escaped the brutal campaign of the Rwandan army during the ªrst war, were still using rear bases in eastern Congo to attack Rwanda. 135 At times, it appeared that "non-Tutsi elements" within Congo's army were also complicit with these rebels, leading Kagame to mistrust Kabila. 136 The tensions between the two rulers escalated between May and August 1998. Around May, Kabila secretly started to provide the ex-FAR/
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Interahamwe with supplies and logistical support. In the context of a largescale insurgency launched by the ex-FAR/Interahamwe in Rwanda's northwestern prefectures, Kabila's support for these génocidaires constituted a serious transnational threat to Kagame's regime. 137 That same month, fearful of a coup, Kabila also purged his presidential guard of all Rwandans. 138 Finally, in July, he replaced Kabarebe with a brother-in-law and asked all foreign troops to leave the country. 139 On August 2, only six days after being expelled, Kagame's army retaliated by reinvading eastern Congo and instigating the creation of the RCD, with Congolese Tutsi in key positions.
U.S. Ambassador Gribbin notes in his memoirs that he considered Kagame's security rationale legitimate, but he also points to a secondary factor for Rwanda's reinvasion: "[W]ell-connected Rwandans in the private sector could seize opportunities to do business or otherwise to accumulate wealth." 140 Similarly, Prunier links the interest in "economic opportunities in the Congo" directly to "the inªghting within the RPF." 141 In mid-1998, Kayumba Nyamwasa, who had been named army chief of staff at the beginning of the year, reportedly came "close to trying a military coup" against Kagame. 142 Therefore, Prunier suggests, a short and successful war in Congo was considered "a nice way out of that tension and an occasion for all to get their share of the spoils." 143 From Kagame's perspective, in other words, the resource opportunities linked to an alliance against Kabila provided a means to ensure his personal political survival. This factor, however, as well as the "ethnic solidarity" and "political triumphalism" evoked by Timothy Longman, 144 played a less signiªcant role than the transnational threat constituted by Kabila's alliance with the ex-FAR/Interahamwe. museveni, the rcd, and the mlc The Ugandan army came to play a major role in the second war, invading northeastern Congo in August 1998 and supporting ªrst the RCD, then also the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC). The breakdown of relations between Kabila and Museveni was closely related to the mistrust between Kabila and Kagame. Gen. Jeje Odongo, appointed Uganda's commander of the army in 1998, believes that the "parting of ways" was directly linked to Kabila's decision to turn on Rwanda. Given the historical "friendship" between Kagame and Museveni, providing support to rebel groups opposed to the former meant, "by extension," also supporting those opposed to the latter. 145 At the time, this reasoning went both ways-Museveni considered the ex-FAR/Interahamwe an enemy of Uganda, as evident in an ofªcial government statement: "Uganda's worst fears had materialised; President Kabila had followed in President Mobutu's footsteps by allying his government with Uganda's enemies-the anti-Uganda insurgents, the ex-FAR and Interahamwe, and the Government of Sudan." 146 Although it is not fully clear whether Kabila's collaboration with Sudanese President Bashir began prior to the outbreak of the war, it appears that, throughout 1997 and 1998, Bashir continued to supply the ADF and other Ugandan rebel groups based in northeastern Congo with arms through airdrops originating from Juba in southern Sudan. 147 Not least due to this support, the Ugandan army operations inside Congo during that period failed to neutralize the ADF. 148 The rebels even launched a series of deadly attacks in western Uganda from June to August 1998, 149 providing circumstantial evidence for Uganda's claim that the increased "frequency, intensity, and destructiveness of cross-border attacks" was "a direct result" of an agreement between Kabila and Bashir in May 1998. 150 In addition to these transnational threats, Museveni's alliance with Congolese rebel groups was motivated by resource opportunities. In its April 2001 report, a United Nations Panel of Experts claims that even if Uganda's political leadership may have had "security and political reasons" for entering the second war, "some top army ofªcials clearly had a hidden agenda: economic and ªnancial objectives." 151 Dan Fahey's meticulously researched dissertation shows that resource opportunities were indeed a major factor for International Security 41:1 174
Uganda's involvement right from the start. 152 Fahey concludes that "the political and economic interests of President Museveni's key regime supporters contributed to his decision to immediately join the Rwandan-led 'rebellion' in Congo. Museveni's patrimonial system in Uganda required him to consider the desires of his family members (e.g., Salim Saleh), senior army ofªcers, and regime insiders who, during the interbellum, openly sought access to natural resources and markets in Congo." 153 Given Museveni's decision in September 1998 to build up the MLC as an alternative to the RCD, it is likely that Museveni also had a motive that went beyond political survival-namely, "to be part of the game and not to abandon the entire Congolese theatre to Kigali." 154 It is highly unlikely, however, that this desire for regional inºuence was independent of, or more important than, the transnational threats and resource opportunities emphasized above.
bashir's alliance with kabila Before turning to the critical role of Zimbabwe and Angola in saving Kabila from imminent defeat in August 1998, a brief analysis of Sudanese President Bashir's alliance with Congolese President Kabila is in order, as it relates directly to Ugandan involvement on the rebel side. Bashir's support to Kabila during the second war was more signiªcant than that for Mobutu during the ªrst war, and it was once again the result of the transnational threat constituted by Ugandan President Museveni's alliance with Bashir's primary enemy, the SPLA. 155 Diplomatic and military sources suggest that, by early September 1998, Bashir's regime was ºying military supplies from southern Sudan to Kabila's army in northeastern Congo. 156 That same month, the Sudanese army accused "Ugandan enemy troops" of supporting SPLA attacks in Sudan. 157 There can be no doubt that Bashir's support to both Kabila and Ugandan reb- 159 Throughout the war, the Zimbabwean contingent was by far the biggest among Kabila's allies, increasing from initially 6,000 up to 16,000 troops in 2001. 160 Mugabe's main motive for supporting Kabila was to protect and expand the resource opportunities offered to Zimbabwe toward the end of the ªrst war, with the desire for regional inºuence playing a secondary role. 161 Zimbabwe's military involvement in the Second Congo War came at a huge public cost-$200 million in the ªrst two years alone 162 -but it also delivered enormous private beneªts for Mugabe's support coalition. 163 Desperate for help, Kabila was willing to make extraordinary concessions, especially with regard to the exploitation of natural resources in the territory under his control. Among those in Zimbabwe's ruling elite who most beneªted from these resource opportunities were the army commander, the defense minister, and a former national security minister. 164 In the context of an increasingly difªcult economic and political situation at home, "the mineral trade in the DRC offered lucrative possibilities for rewarding loyal ofªcers." 165 The intervention International Security 41:1 176 on Kabila's side thus represented "a sop to the military, an attempt to ensure its allegiance to Mugabe." 166 By contrast, some scholars suggest that economic motives came to the fore only later in the conºict, and that Mugabe's initial decision to support Kabila once again had more to with a desire for regional inºuence. In particular, Mugabe is said to have wanted to assert himself as the main regional leader within SADC, thus upstaging South African President Nelson Mandela. 167 Although this motive likely played a secondary role, it is highly doubtful that Mugabe would have committed thousands of troops to Congo in the absence of previous investments and an expectation of additional resource opportunities. 168 dos santos's continued alliance with kabila Angolan President dos Santos hesitated to take sides in the Second Congo War for more than two weeks, but once he did, the intervention of Angolan troops, ªghter-bombers, and attack helicopters played a key role in saving Kabila from the RCD and Rwandan expeditionary force that had been airlifted to western Congo. 169 In April 1999, dos Santos, Mugabe, Namibian President Sam Nujoma, and Kabila formalized their interstate alliances by signing a defense pact in Luanda. 170 Although dos Santos committed far fewer soldiers to Congo than did Zimbabwe, the specter of Angolan air power continued to limit the extent of rebel offensives throughout the war. 171 Scholars widely agree that, similar to his involvement in the ªrst war, dos Santos's intervention on Kabila's side was a result of the transnational threat constituted by UNITA and its (potential) external backers. 172 In early August 1998, the renewed eruption of civil war in Angola seemed inevitable, and dos Santos's "greatest concern" was "Kabila's rickety regime." 173 Dos Santos feared that growing instability in the DRC would enable UNITA to
The Origins of Transnational Alliances 177 bring in supplies through western Congo, and there were several indications that, prior to the outbreak of the Second Congo War, Kabila's opponents had developed relations both with UNITA and with separatists ªghting for the independence of Cabinda, an oil-rich Angolan exclave that lies between Congo-Brazzaville and Congo-Kinshasa. More speciªcally, RCD Vice President Arthur Zahidi Ngoma had met a secessionist leader in Paris in July 1998; UNITA Vice President Antonio Dembo and several former Mobutu generals with close links to UNITA had reportedly been received in Rwanda; and UNITA President Jonas Savimbi himself had been seen in Uganda. 174 Given these links, dos Santos had good reasons to feel threatened by the prospect of a new regime in Kinshasa led by the RCD and beholden to Rwanda and Uganda. By contrast, the decision to save Kabila from imminent defeat promised greater control over Congolese territory, given that Kabila's military dependence on Angola was assumed to ensure his cooperation against UNITA. 175 summary of cases The ten case studies of foreign rulers' alliance decisions in the two Congo Wars provide substantial support for the strategic theory of transnational alliance formation developed in this article. In six cases, foreign rulers sided with Congolese rebels: Kagame, Museveni, dos Santos, and Mugabe supported the AFDL in the ªrst war; Kagame and Museveni sponsored the RCD (and, in Museveni's case, also the MLC) in the second war. For ªve out of these six decisions, transnational threats offer the most convincing explanationcombined with resource opportunities in the case of Museveni's decision in the second war (see the overview in table 2). Mugabe's support for the AFDL is the only decision in which motives beyond political survival provide one of the main explanations; but even here, evidence suggests that resource opportunities were at least as important as political ideology and the desire for regional inºuence.
In the four other cases, foreign rulers sided with their Congolese counterparts: Bashir supported Mobutu in the ªrst war; Bashir, dos Santos, and Mugabe backed Kabila in the second war. These decisions can all be explained by extending the logic of my strategic theory. For three of them (Bashir's involvement in both wars and dos Santos's alliance with Kabila in the second International war), indirect transnational threats offer the best explanation. In the fourth case (Mugabe's involvement in the second war), resource opportunities were arguably of greatest importance.
In short, the strategic theory alone best explains nine of the ten cases, with alternative explanations playing a major role in only one case. As a secondary factor, however, inºuence-seeking appears to have played a role in three additional cases-both of Museveni's decisions, as well as Mugabe's second decision. Transnational ethnic afªnities contributed to Kagame's decisions, but they were less important than Atzili's earlier analysis suggests. 176
Conclusion
The main argument of this article is that most African rulers form alliances with rebel groups abroad to alleviate threats to their political survival at home. By conceiving of security cooperation between rulers and foreign rebels as transnational alliances, the article connects the recent scholarly interest in the transnational dimensions of civil war to the much older literature on military alliances in international relations. In the early 1990s, Michael Barnett, Jack Levy, and Steven David challenged realist alliance formation theories that focus on external threats to states, suggesting instead that-at least in what was then called the Third World-interstate alliances were primarily determined by internal threats to rulers. 177 The strategic theory developed above extends this basic idea to transnational alliances and speciªes three causal mechanisms that link the threats of coups and rebellions to the formation of alliances with foreign rebel groups. The application of this theory to the ªve most important foreign rulers involved in the two Congo Wars shows that it offers powerful and parsimonious explanations for why these rulers sided either with their counterparts or with Congolese rebels. The article thus makes contributions to the study of civil war and military alliances in general, as well as to the study of the Congo Wars in particular.
While the article focuses on the formation of transnational alliances, it also provides conceptual and theoretical foundations for future research on the management and termination of transnational alliances. Here, too, it will be useful to take into account existing work on interstate alliances and to ask to what extent ªndings from that literature are relevant in a transnational con- text. 178 This turn to alliance dynamics will require a greater focus on the preferences and actions of rebel allies, taking them seriously as actors in their own right rather than as pawns of foreign states. 179 Recent research suggests that neither the literature on interstate alliance politics nor that on conºict delegation, which applies insights from principal-agent theory, can fully account for the particular dynamics of transnational alliances. 180 Future research should also pay greater attention to cross-regional differences. A closer look at the Uppsala Conºict Data Program's External Support Data, which covers the period from 1975 to 2009, suggests that mutual interference between neighboring states-in the sense of tit-for-tat support to rebel groups-is rare outside of Africa: the dataset reveals ªfteen such cases in Africa, but only one in the Middle East and two in Asia. 181 It thus appears that the interference dilemma highlighted by my theory's transnational threat mechanism applies mainly to African rulers. Similarly, Philip Roessler ªnds that his coup-prooªng theory of civil war, driven by the idea of an internal security dilemma between a ruler and ethnic rivals within the ruler's support coalition, works primarily in Africa. 182 There seems to be something unique not only about the threats that African rulers face but also about how these rulers respond to them in both their domestic and foreign policies. Further research is required to establish the extent to which the origins of transnational alliances in Africa differ from those in other regions. A good place to start would be the ongoing Syrian conºict, in which transnational alliances-between President Bashar al-Assad and the Lebanese Hezbollah on the one side, and a panoply of states and Syrian rebels on the other-play a critical role. Did
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Middle Eastern rulers choose sides based on "larger regional ambitions," 183 or were at least some of their alliance decisions driven by concerns about internal threats to their political survival?
The ªndings of this article also have policy implications. How to prevent, or at least help end, transnational alliances is a question of particular policy relevance, as external support to rebel groups has been found to both prolong and intensify civil wars. 184 In this regard, two implications follow from my theory. First, to prevent or alleviate the mistrust that drives interference dilemmas, third-party actors could help neighboring rulers send each other reassuring "costly signals" about their benign intentions 185 -for instance, by monitoring mutual commitments to police each other's exiled opposition. 186 Second, to increase the private costs of supporting foreign rebels and thus undermine resource opportunities, third-party actors could strengthen existing efforts to monitor sources of rebel group funding and link these efforts to credible threats of targeted sanctions against foreign rulers and members of their support coalitions. 187 Both steps would help avoid the externalization of internal threats.
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